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3 Foreign 'Penetrations' Of F.B.I. Offices Indicated

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WASHINGTON, March 9 — The Federal Bureau of Investigation may have been "penetrated" by hostile foreign intelligence agencies on at least three occasions since the end of World War II, according to a former intelligence official who says he has direct knowledge of all three incidents.

The evidence in each case, which involved bureau agents in New York, Washington and another undisclosed American city, was entirely circumstantial, the former official said, and no criminal charges were ever brought against the three agents thought to have been subverted by foreign governments.

But in one case, he said, the conclusion that an agent assigned to the Bureau's Washington field office had become a paid Soviet spy was virtually inescapable, even though the man broke off his alleged relationship with Soviet intelligence after he became aware of an internal F.B.I. investigation of his activities.

Clarence M. Kelley, the F.B.I. director, said through a spokesman that, over the years, "several allegations have come to our attention that attempts have been made to penetrate the F.B.I."

Mr. Kelley said that what he termed "exhaustive investigations" had not "disclosed any evidence that a hostile foreign intelligence service ever successfully recruited or operated an employee of the F.B.I."

The director's statement did not take account, however, of instances in which the bureau's agents might have voluntarily

approached representatives of hostile governments with offers to sell or provide information, which was understood to have been the case with the Washington F.B.I. agent.

Nor did it refer to any instances in which the results of investigations of such matters were officially termed inconclusive, as one bureau official said today had been true of the New York incident.

Both the F.B.I. and the Central Intelligence Agency have declined repeatedly to discuss the subject of possible penetrations of their organizations by double agents, a matter to which they accord the highest sensitivity and one that neither the Senate nor House intelligence committees have attempted to examine.

Penetrations of the Soviet K.G.B. and virtually all of the major Western intelligence services have been documented over the years, but there has never been any detailed public allegation of a successful penetration of the C.I.A. or, apart from the former official's assertions, of the F.B.I.

However, Anatoli Golitsin, a Soviet K.G.B. major who defected to the United States in 1961, is reliably reported to have told American and British counterintelligence officials that such penetrations had occurred.

According to one official present at that meeting, Mr. Golit-

sin employed a medical analogy in asserting that the British service was "sick," having been penetrated at various levels that the C.I.A., "also sick," had been penetrated broadly at a fairly low level and that the F.B.I. was "dying."

Mr. Golitsin reportedly did not elaborate on that occasion on his remark about the F.B.I., but the former American official described the circumstances of the purported Soviet penetration of the bureau's Washington field office, a unit set up apart from F.B.I. headquarters here to handle Federal investigations in this city.

The bureau's suspicions were first aroused in the early 1960's, the former official recalled, when three top secret documents were discovered to be missing from the field office's files.

Their whereabouts remained unknown, he said, until a disgruntled Soviet official somewhere in the world approached an American naval attache and offered to sell him the three documents for \$10,000.

That was the first indication, the former official said, that the missing papers had fallen into Soviet hands.

F.B.I. counterintelligence specialists, he said, later received information that an agent in the Washington office who had had access to the documents had been working as a paid operative of the K.G.B., presumably to help pay off substantial gambling debts he had accrued.

The bureau was told that the agent would make contact at a certain hour with his Soviet "control" from a telephone

booth outside a restaurant in suburban Maryland, and placed the booth under surveillance.

Because the man could be expected to recognize his colleagues from the Washington office, the former official said that undercover agents from the Baltimore office were brought in for the task.

The suspected agent did arrive at the appointed time, the former official said, entered the telephone booth, dialed a number and then hung up—a standard Soviet intelligence technique for initiating a telephone contact.

A few minutes later, agents secreted in and around the restaurant heard the telephone ring and saw the F.B.I. man answer it. After an extended conversation he left the booth, only to recognize one of the supposedly incognito Baltimore agents and make a hasty departure.

The Washington agent, the former official said, immediately broke off his relationship with the Russians. A polygraph examination proved inconclusive and he was allowed to resign quietly.

Fewer details were available about the New York incident except that the internal investigation of the suspected agent there continued, as one bureau official said, "for a long time."

But several intelligence officials said that it was separate from an incident, described in published accounts several months ago, in which an agent in the New York City field office became involved with a waitress in an East Side restaurant frequented by bureau agents at lunchtime.